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INTRODUCTION
President Barack Obama’s 2008 election victory marked a
paradigm shift in U.S. political history. For the first time, an
American presidential campaign focused its efforts on new
technology and the Internet.1 In the months leading up to Election
Day, the Obama campaign utilized several web-based applications,
including Facebook, Myspace, and YouTube, to raise money,
spread his political platforms, and, most importantly, establish a
formidable base of young supporters.2
After being elected, President Obama continued to employ the
technology-based tactics that had proven so useful during his
campaign. Remnants of an antiquated system began to move out,
and a surge of technology-based systems emerged. The most
prominent change was the creation of two new administrative
positions, the Chief Technology Officer (“CTO”) and the Chief
Information Officer (“CIO”). Their primary roles are to create
changes to more efficiently utilize technology throughout
government3 and to oversee the government’s extensive
technological infrastructure, which includes twelve thousand major
Information Technology systems and the hundreds of thousands of
databases behind those systems.4 As these databases host
countless confidential federal documents, the officers’
responsibilities cannot be understated.
On December 9, 2010, Vivek Kundra, President Obama’s
choice to serve as the nation’s first CIO, mandated that all

1

Matthew Fraser & Soumitra Dutta, Barack Obama and the Facebook Election, U.S.
NEWS & WORLD REPORT (Nov. 19, 2008), http://www.usnews.com/opinion/articles/2008/
11/19/barack-obama-and-the-facebook-election (“[Obama] will be the first occupant of
the White House to have won a presidential election on the Web.”).
2
Id.
3
See Technology, THE WHITE HOUSE, http://www.whitehouse.gov/issues/technology
(last visited Mar. 13, 2013 2:25 PM).
4
Transparency and Federal Management IT Systems: Hearing Before the Subcomm.
on Tech., Info. Policy, Intergovernmental Relations & Procurement Reform of the H.
Comm. On Oversight & Gov’t Reform, 112th Cong. 7 (2011) (statement of Vivek
Kundra, Federal Chief Information Officer, Office of Management and Budget)
[hereinafter Transparency and Federal Management IT Systems].
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government agencies “shift to [the] ‘Cloud First’ policy.”5 Most
government agencies began this process by sharing their data with
private corporations that offer Internet storage opportunities or
cloud computing services.6 Naturally, whenever the government
changes the way in which it performs its daily business, those who
work in government begin to recognize risks that may have been
given little thought before the plan was implemented. In 2011,
Vivek Kundra wrote in an op-ed article in the New York Times that
“[o]ne of the critical remaining issues concerning cloud computing
is whether cloud data can and should flow between nations and
what restrictions should be placed upon it.”7 Although the
motivation exists, and the financial resources are available to begin
the transition, these security and privacy issues have not been
resolved.
As the government increasingly relies on cloud computing
technology to provide storage and perform computing tasks, voices
from across the industry have raised concern over how these data
servers will remain secure, governed, and protected. On May 25,
2011, Representative Sheila Jackson Lee remarked at a hearing
before the Subcommittee on Intellectual Property, Competition,
and the Internet that “the current trend of technology is to place
information onto the cloud of third party operating systems and
allows phones and computers to access this information. . . . [H]ow
will the Government address jurisdictional issues? I don’t want to
ask about the Government, but what are you all doing with respect
to that concept?”8 These voices will continue to be heard as the
5
VIVEK KUNDRA, THE WHITE HOUSE, 25 POINT IMPLEMENTATION PLAN TO REFORM
FEDERAL INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY MANAGEMENT (2010), available at
https://cio.gov/wp-content/uploads/downloads/2012/09/25-Point-Implementation-Planto-Reform-Federal-IT.pdf [hereinafter 25 POINT IMPLEMENTATION PLAN].
Steven
VanRoekel, a former Microsoft executive, replaced Kundra as the new U.S. CIO on
August 5, 2011 and remained dedicated to the 25 Point Plan. See Steven VanRoekel,
Shocking the System Through IT Reform, THE WHITE HOUSE (June 7, 2012, 4:55 PM),
http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2012/06/07/shocking-system-through-it-reform
(discussing the successes of the Plan since its inception).
6
See infra Part II.A.2.
7
Vivek Kundra, Tight Budget? Look to the “Cloud,” N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 30, 2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/31/opinion/tightbudget-look-to-the-cloud.html?_r=1&.
8
Cybersecurity: Innovative Solutions to Challenging Problems: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Intellectual Property, Competition, and the Internet of the H. Comm. On
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United States and its private data become “virtual” without
concrete plans for protecting the security of our information.
Further, the location of data storage often has choice-of-law
implications. If a data sever replicates one’s information for
safekeeping, multiple countries may have concurrent jurisdiction
over the data server and subsequent legal disputes can occur.
This is not the first time in history that the government has
been involved in jurisdictional challenges related to location and
data security. After September 11, 2001, a United States program
run by the Central Intelligence Agency and overseen by the
Department of the Treasury used financial records to track and
review the suspicious transactions of individuals suspected of
having ties with Al Qaeda.9 These international bank transactions
were processed through the Society for Worldwide Interbank
Financial Telecommunication (“SWIFT”), a Belgian cooperative.10
“SWIFT operated two redundant data centers—one in the United
States and one in the Netherlands,” governed respectively by
American and European law.11 The Department of the Treasury
exerted jurisdiction over all of SWIFT’s data through its authority
over the U.S. center.12
The Treasury program was publicly disclosed in 2006, leading
many Europeans to claim that “American access to European
banking data violated European data privacy laws.”13 “European
authorities compelled SWIFT to bifurcate [the] data storage,
keeping European data exclusively on the Netherlands [sic] server”
so as to subject the data to European privacy regulation.14

the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 85 (2011) (statement of Rep. Sheila Jackson Lee, Member, H.
Comm. On the Judiciary).
9
See Eric Lichtblau & James Risen, Bank Data Is Sifted by U.S. in Secret to Block
Terror, N.Y. TIMES (June 23, 2006), http://www.nytimes.com/2006/06/23/washington/
23intel.html?pagewanted=1.
10
See id.
11
Michael Chertoff, Data Sovereignty in the Cloud: The Issues for Government,
SAFEGOV (Nov. 1, 2011), http://safegov.org/2011/11/1/data-sovereignty-in-the-cloud-theissues-for-government.
12
Id.
13
Id.
14
Id.
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As one can see, the location of data storage often implicates
choice-of-law considerations. If a data server replicates one’s
information for safekeeping, multiple countries may have
concurrent jurisdiction over the data server and subsequent legal
disputes can occur.
This Note proceeds in three parts. Part I introduces cloud
computing technology, the U.S. government’s move to cloud
computing, the present state of U.S. jurisdictional law, and
international regulations governing data and privacy. Part II
examines how international regulations governing cloud
computing technology differ from regulations in the United States.
Part II also illustrates several conflicts that could arise if the United
States does not increase its regulation of the cloud computing
industry. Finally, Part III proposes two solutions to achieve
security while the U.S. government moves to cloud computing.
The government should either maintain data centers on its own
property and contract out its technological needs, or else adopt a
cohesive regulatory system that emulates the European Union’s by
requiring that government data be maintained domestically, even if
not specifically on government owned property.
I. BACKGROUND
This Part provides a background for understanding how cloud
computing raises jurisdictional questions, thereby affecting control
and access to data. Part I.A discusses the history and current
infrastructure of cloud computing technology. Part I.B explains
the U.S. government’s shift to cloud computing technology. Part
I.C explores the effect of U.S. jurisdictional law on cloud
computing, while Part I.D discusses the international approach to
regulating data.
A. What’s in a Name: The Present State of Cloud Computing
1. The Definition and History of Cloud Computing
“Cloud computing” is a misnomer. On its face, the term
“cloud” suggests that when a user composes an e-mail and clicks
“send,” the e-mail floats up and is stored somewhere in the sky. In
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reality, the opposite is true. While satellites often transmit data for
the purposes of cloud computing, technology companies that offer
cloud computing services store and process data on the ground in
massive “server farms.”15 These server farms contain hundreds of
thousands of individual servers.16 When a user accesses data
stored on a server, it is referred to as using cloud computing
technology.17
The term “cloud computing” was first developed in the 1960s
when corporations used a cloud symbol to represent the Internet
during business meetings.18 However, it was not publicly used to
describe an approach to data storage until August 2006 when
Google CEO Eric Schmidt first publicly used the term at a search
engine conference in San Jose, California.19 According to a news
report by NBC, this may have been an early start to the GoogleAmazon “Internet wars,” as Schmidt may have been trying to preempt Amazon’s Elastic Compute Cloud system, which was
released that same month.20
Cloud computing can be defined as a “computing model” used
to deliver information technology and computing services through
the Internet,21 to store data, or to offer services such as virtual

15

Paul T. Jaeger, Jimmy Lin, Justin M. Grimes, & Shannon N. Simmons, Where is the
Cloud? Geography, Economics, Environment, and Jurisdiction in Cloud Computing, 14
FIRST MONDAY 1, § 4 (2009), available at http://firstmonday.org/htbin/cgiwrap/bin/ojs/
index.php/fm/article/view/2456/2171.
16
Id. While larger companies, such as Amazon and Google, are able to maintain their
own server farms, “[m]any companies rent space in shared (or ‘co-location’) centers
belonging to” larger companies. Not a Cloud in Sight, ECONOMIST (Oct. 27, 2012),
http://www.economist.com/news/special-report/21565003-best-places-store-yourterabytes-not-cloud-sight.
17
See Mark Koba, Cloud Computing: CNBC Explains, CNBC (June 29, 2011, 11:30
AM),
http://www.cnbc.com/id/43483060/Cloud_Computing_CNBC_Explains
(“In
simplest terms, cloud computing involves delivering hosted services over the Internet.
The service end is where the data or software is stored and the user end is a single person
or company network.”).
18
Id.
19
Id.
20
Id.
21
See Vivek Kundra, Streaming at 1:00: In the Cloud, THE WHITE HOUSE (Sept. 15,
2009, 12:09 PM), http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/streaming-at-100-in-the-cloud.
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desktops, which allow remote access to data.22 Before cloud
computing, a computer could only run software that was installed
on its hard drive, and a computer’s capabilities were limited to the
data and processing power contained therein.23 For example, in the
1990s, users who wanted to use the AOL Instant Messenger
(“AIM”) application were required to install software from a CD
onto their computers to access the application.24
Cloud computing has revolutionized how users interact with
software by allowing a computer to serve as simply the front-end
portal, an access point through which users access software and
data on remote servers. Today’s version of AIM—Google Chat,
the instant message feature of Google’s Gmail—does not require
users to load or download software; instead, the program initiates
once a user accesses the program through Gmail.25 Among other
advantages of cloud computing, users can access vastly larger
stores of data and greater processing power through cloud
computing than their personal computers would otherwise allow.26
2. Daily Interactions with Cloud Computing
In this age of robust technology, a majority of the U.S.
population has used cloud computing in one way or another.27
According to the U.S. Census Bureau’s 2011 Current Population
Survey, seventy-eight percent of American adults use the

22

Richard Spires, Cloud Computing, Front and Center, CIOC BLOG (Sept. 6, 2011),
https://cio.gov/cloud-computing-front-and-center.
23
See Michael Miller, Cloud Computing Pros and Cons for End Users, QUE
PUBLISHING (Feb. 13, 2009), http://www.quepublishing.com/articles/article.aspx
?p=1324280.
24
See Burn-Your-Own-AOL-CD, AOL HELP, http://help.aol.com/help/microsites/
search.do?cmd=displayKC&externalId=223798#fourth (“The AOL Installer CD is no
longer available at a retail store . . . .”).
25
About Chatting in Gmail, GOOGLE, http://mail.google.com/mail/help/chat.html (last
visited Feb. 12, 2012).
26
See Miller, supra note 23; see also JOHN VILLASENOR, CENTER FOR TECHNOLOGY
INNOVATION AT BROOKINGS, ADDRESSING EXPORT CONTROL IN THE AGE OF CLOUD
COMPUTING 1 (Christine Jacobs ed., 2011), available at http://www.brookings.edu/~/
media/Files/rc/papers/2011/0725_cloud_computing_villasenor/0725_cloud_computing_v
illasenor.pdf.
27
The PC Generation: Computer Use, 2000, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (2010),
http://www.census.gov/population/pop-profile/2000/chap10.pdf.
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Internet.28 This often requires interfacing with cloud computing
technology. Any AOL, Hotmail, Yahoo Mail, or Gmail user has
interacted with cloud computing technology.29 Further, each of the
300 million photographs uploaded to Facebook every day
represents an interaction with cloud computing technology.30
Industry research predicts that the cloud computing market will
swell to a $241 billion industry by 2020.31
Cloud computing services can be broken down into three main
service models: Software as a Service (SaaS), Infrastructure as a
Service (IaaS), and Platform as a Service (PaaS).32 SaaS includes
blogs, applications available on a smartphone or tablet,33 and any
software that can be accessed through a web browser, such as
Email as a Service (EaaS).34 SaaS powers all of Google’s

28

See Adult Computer and Adult Internet Users by Selected Characteristics: 2000 to
2011, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (2012), http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/2012/
tables/12s1158.pdf; see also Digital Nation: Expanding Internet Usage, U.S. DEP’T. OF
COMMERCE, NAT’L TELECOMM. & INFO. ADMIN. (2011), available at http://www.ntia.
doc.gov/files/ntia/publications/ntia_internet_use_report_february_2011.pdf (“As a group,
an estimated 209 million Americans—about 72 percent of all adults and children ages
three years and older—use the Internet somewhere, whether it be at home, the workplace,
schools, libraries, or a neighbor’s house.”).
29
See, e.g., Aaron Lake & Jacob Rosenberg, You’ve Got . . . AOL Cloud Computing,
UPTIME INSTITUTE, http://symposium.uptimeinstitute.com/advanced-search/1234-youvegot-aol-cloud-computing (last visited Mar. 13, 2013).
30
See Loek Essers, Facebook to Use ‘Cold Storage’ to Deal with Vast Amounts of
(Oct.
17,
2012),
http://www.infoworld.com/d/cloudData,
INFOWORLD
computing/facebook-use-cold-storage-deal-vast-amounts-of-data-205127.
31
Forrester Forecasts USD 241 Billion Cloud Computing Market By 2020,
INFORMATION WEEK (Apr. 26, 2011), http://www.informationweek.in/Cloud_
Computing/11-04-26/Forrester_forecasts_USD_241_billion_cloud_computing_
market_by_2020.aspx.
32
Vivek Kundra, Federal Cloud Computing Strategy, THE WHITE HOUSE 6 (2011),
https://cio.gov/wp-content/uploads/downloads/2012/09/Federal-Cloud-ComputingStrategy.pdf.
33
See Gianpaolo Carraro & Fred Chong, Software as a Service (SaaS): An Enterprise
Perspective, MSDN (Oct. 2006), http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/aa905332.aspx
(“Simply put, SaaS can be defined as—software deployed as a hosted service and
accessed over the Internet.”).
34
See Email as a Service (EaaS), INFO.APPS.GOV, http://www.info.apps.gov/content/
email-service-eaas-0 (last visited Mar. 13, 2013) (explaining how E-mail as a service
virtually delivers an e-mail program to your computer without the need for a software
program).
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applications, or “Apps,”35 such as Gmail, Google Calendar, Google
Docs, and Google Drive.36 Today, when a user logs into Gmail,
Google’s e-mail program, the user accesses e-mail through a
remote Google program that has not been installed on the user’s
computer.37 When the user sends an e-mail to another user through
Gmail, Google stores that data on its data server until the recipient
opens the e-mail, thereby drawing information from the data server
onto the user’s monitor.38 Every time a user accesses the
restaurant reservation website OpenTable, uses Adobe services, or
takes a survey through Survey Monkey, she is accessing a SaaS
platform.
IaaS provides virtual hardware storage for corporations and
government users, such as Amazon web services.39 PaaS includes
a platform for accessing other cloud software—an example is
Facebook.40
Data servers that store private, business, and governmental
information are located all over the world.41 These server farms

35

Wesley Chun, What is Cloud Computing?, GOOGLE DEVELOPERS (June 2012),
https://developers.google.com/appengine/training/intro/whatiscc (“Another example of
SaaS from Google includes their Apps product: office productivity software hosted and
run by Google online.”).
36
Google Apps for Business, GOOGLE, http://www.google.com/enterprise/apps/
business/index21.html?utm_expid=65468332-15&utm (last visited Mar. 29, 2013).
37
See
Supported
Browsers,
GOOGLE,
http://support.google.com/mail/bin/
answer.py?hl=en&answer=6557 (last updated Dec. 28, 2012) (stating that a user must use
an Internet browser to access all Google remote programs such as Gmail).
38
See What Happens to Messages Stored on Gmail’s Servers?, GOOGLE,
http://support.google.com/mail/bin/answer.py?hl=en&answer=13288&topic=1668962&c
tx=topic (last updated Oct. 16, 2012).
39
See Chun, supra note 35.
40
See Cloud Computing, MICROSOFT, http://www.microsoft.com/industry/government/
guides/cloud_computing/5-PaaS.aspx (“With Platform as a Service (PaaS), you can
develop new applications or services in the cloud that do not depend on a specific
platform to run, and you can make them widely available to users through the Internet.”);
see also David Kirkpatrick, Facebook’s Changes—It’s All About the Platform, FORBES
(Sept. 22, 2011, 5:54 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/techonomy/2011/09/22/
facebooks-changesits-all-about-the-platform; Phil Wainewright, Is Facebook a Paas
Contender?, ZDNET (Apr. 11, 2008, 5:07 PM), http://www.zdnet.com/blog/saas/isfacebook-a-paas-contender/488.
41
See Mark Prigg, Inside the Internet: Google Allows First Ever Look at the Eight
Vast Data Centres that Power the Online World, MAILONLINE (Oct. 17, 2012, 1:22 PM),
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are extraordinarily costly to run and power.42 As a result,
American companies seek to reduce the operating costs of cloud
computing technology by locating these servers outside of the
United States.43 For instance, Amazon has data servers located in
São Paulo, Amsterdam, Dublin, Frankfurt, London, Paris,
Stockholm, Hong Kong, Singapore and Tokyo.44 Google, having
long kept their servers’ locations discreet, has recently revealed
some information about the locations of their data centers.45
Facebook opened an enormous server farm, the size of eleven
football fields, in Luleå, Sweden to take advantage of the cold
climate and to lower the costs associated with cooling down data
servers.46 Amazon, Google, and Facebook are just three of the
many corporations that provide cloud computing services and store
their data servers worldwide.
3. Data Replication as a Way of Protecting Information
There are also environmental risks associated with the location
and maintenance of data servers. In December 2011, Microsoft’s
cloud computing program Azure reported that their data centers
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/sciencetech/article-2219188/Inside-Google-pictures-giveslook-8-vast-data-centres.html (last updated Oct. 19, 2012).
42
See Richard Orange, Global Server Farms Around the World, THE TELEGRAPH (Oct.
26, 2011, 4:04 PM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/facebook/8850861/Globalserver-farms-around-the-world.html.
43
See Veronique Greenwood, Move Server Farms to Desert? Data is Easier to Move
Than Power, After All, DISCOVER (Apr. 27, 2011, 12:08 PM), https://blogs.discover
magazine.com/80beats/2011/04/27/move-server-farms-to-desert-data-is-easier-to-movethan-power-after-all/#.UVNaWaV4sW9 (“Keeping all those servers cool has been said to
eat up 50% of the electricity such centers need—in fact, Iceland has proposed that its
chilly climate makes it an ideal place for server farms.”); Richard Orange, Facebook to
Build Server Farm on Edge of Arctic Circle, TELEGRAPH (Oct. 26, 2011, 2:47 PM),
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/facebook/8850575/Facebook-to-build-serverfarm-on-edge-of-Arctic-Circle.html.
44
Amazon CloudFront, AMAZON WEB SERVICES, http://aws.amazon.com/cloudfront/;
Amazon Simple Storage Service (Amazon S3), AMAZON WEB SERVICES, http://aws.
amazon.com/s3; Rich Miller, Where Amazon’s Data Centers Are Located, DATA CENTER
KNOWLEDGE (Nov. 18, 2008), http://www.datacenterknowledge.com/archives/2008/11/
18/where-amazons-data-centers-are-located.
45
See Prigg, supra note 41; see also Data Center Locations, GOOGLE,
http://www.google.com/about/datacenters/inside/locations (last visited Apr. 4, 2013)
(listing the domestic and international location of thirteen data centers in the Americas,
Asia and Europe).
46
See Orange, supra note 43.
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lose power and information 11.1 times per month due to electrical
outages.47 This risk is especially prevalent in areas prone to
natural disasters.48 The production of data server components,
which often takes place in these risk-prone areas, further threatens
the functionality of server farms. For example, the New York
Times reported that, in November 2011, flooding forced factories
producing hard drives in Thailand to shut down.49 These hard
drives are necessary to store data in cloud computing centers.50
Thailand’s estimated production loss was thirty percent of its
annual output, or fifty million hard drives.51 With the booming
cloud computing industry already operating at a ninety percent
production output, the Thailand disaster posed a marked threat to
companies such as Western Digital, one of the world’s biggest
storage companies.52
To protect against data loss, Google and Amazon have been
using data replication systems.53 Through data replication,
information is replicated and then stored in multiple locations to

47

Andrew R. Hickey, Amazon, Microsoft Top Short List of Cloud Storage Providers:
Study, CRN (Dec. 9, 2011, 11:40 AM), http://www.crn.com/news/cloud/232300242/
amazon-microsoft-top-short-list-of-cloud-storage-providers-study.htm;jsessionid
=HBnfEdtD4F0qsPfqVY5Eog**.ecappj01?pgno=1.
48
See Lori MacVittie, Cloud Computing: Location Is Important, but not the Way You
Think, DEVCENTRAL (Jan. 21, 2009), http://devcentral.f5.com/weblogs/macvittie/
archive/2009/01/21/cloud-computing-location-is-important-but-not-the-way-you.aspx.
49
Nick Bilton, Thailand Floods Could Affect Cloud Computing, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 4,
2011, 9:45 AM), http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/11/04/thailand-floods-will-affectcomputer-makers-and-web-sites/?scp=1&sq=cloud%20computing&st=cse.
50
See id.
51
See id.
52
See id. (“Component makers in China, the Philippines and Malaysia could pick up
some of the slack, but many global hard drive makers are already operating at over 90
percent production, with some in China at 98 percent.”); Dean Takahashi, WD Resumes
Hard Drive Production After Thailand Floods, VENTUREBEAT (Dec. 1, 2011, 6:39 PM),
http://venturebeat.com/2011/12/01/wd-resumes-hard-drive-production-after-thailandfloods.
53
See Amazon Relational Database Service (Amazon RDS), AMAZON WEB SERVICES,
http://aws.amazon.com/rds/ (last visited Mar. 13, 2013) (“Amazon RDS automatically
patches the database software and backs up your database, storing the backups for a userdefined retention period and enabling point-in-time recovery.”); see also Disaster
Recovery by Google, GOOGLE (Mar. 4, 2010), http://googleenterprise.blogspot.com/2010/
03/disaster-recovery-by-google.html.
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ensure that the information is always accessible and secure in the
event of disaster or intentional destruction.54
B. The U.S. Government’s Plan for Cloud Computing
The federal government is among the greatest spenders on
technology in the United States.55 Each year, the government
spends $80 billion dollars on information technology.56 As such,
when Vivek Kundra, the former U.S. Chief Information Officer
(CIO), joined the Obama Administration, one of his main
objectives was the promotion of efficient and effective use of the
federal information technology budget.57 Inefficiencies in the
system ranged from having thousands of inactive websites to
having more than ten thousand separate information technology
systems that were idle ninety-three percent of the time.58 Kundra,
who unsurprisingly also fought to make President Obama the first
president to receive a smartphone, started consolidating these IT
systems—marking the government’s shift towards cloud
computing systems.59
At the Forum on Information Technology Management Reform
in December 2010, Kundra released his “25 Point Implementation
Plan to Reform Federal Information Technology Management.”60
The eighteen-month plan proposed a three-step “Cloud First”
policy for all federal agencies.61 The Cloud First policy required
54
See Danny Bradbury, Remote Replication: Comparing Data Replication Methods,
COMPUTERWEEKLY.COM, http://www.computerweekly.com/feature/Remote-replicationComparing-data-replication-methods (“Remote replication copies data to a secondary site
as part of a disaster recovery plan; it traditionally involved backing up application data,
but it is now possible to replicate entire virtual machines too. This can be useful to
maintain server images with the latest configuration, including operating system and
application security patches that are all set to be made live in case of a serious outage at
the primary site.”).
55
Geoff Colvin, Uncle Sam’s First CIO, FORTUNE MAGAZINE (July 13, 2011, 3:37
PM),
http://money.cnn.com/2011/07/13/news/companies/vivek_kundra_leadership.
fortune/index.htm (“The U.S. government is the world’s largest consumer of information
technology . . . .”).
56
Id.
57
See Transparency and Federal Management IT Systems, supra note 4.
58
See Colvin, supra note 56.
59
Id.
60
25 POINT IMPLEMENTATION PLAN, supra note 5, at 1.
61
Id.
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the agencies to use cloud computing instead of buying hardware
and software.62 Under Cloud First, agencies had an obligation to
identify three “must move” services by March 2010, and to move
one of these to the cloud by December 2010, and to then move the
remaining two services to the cloud by June 2011.63 Kundra
predicted that the U.S. government would save at least five billion
dollars by using cloud computing instead of the old hard-copy
storage system.64
On February 8, 2011, Kundra released the “Federal Cloud
Computing Strategy,” which further explains the role of cloud
computing in federal agencies and outlines his expectations under
the Cloud First policy.65 Cloud First imposes many new
technological requirements on federal agencies. Each agency has
its own designated Chief Information Officer, who is tasked with
carrying out the 25 Point Plan and ensuring that its requirements
are met.66 The CIO of each federal agency is also responsible for
ensuring a “safe, secure cloud solution” and for overseeing the
allocation of funds.67 Cloud First also requires each agency to
“[d]etermine cloud readiness” and ensure that the security
requirements are met.68
To comply with these security
requirements, CIOs must look at “[s]tatutory compliance to laws,
regulations, and agency requirements,” privacy and confidentiality,
integrity, and “[d]ata controls and access policies to determine
where data can be stored and who can access physical locations.”69

62

25 POINT IMPLEMENTATION PLAN, supra note 5, at 1. See also David Saleh Rauf,
Stakes High for Cloud Contractors, POLITICO (Sept. 18, 2011, 10:54 PM),
http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0911/63786.html#ixzz1bAXu6nqE.
63
25 POINT IMPLEMENTATION PLAN, supra note 5, at 1.
64
See Kim Hart, Vivek Kundra Leaving White House for Harvard, POLITICO (June 16,
2011, 9:37 AM), http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0611/57115.html.
65
VIVEK KUNDRA, THE WHITE HOUSE, FEDERAL CLOUD COMPUTING STRATEGY 2
(2011), available at http://ctovision.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/02/Federal-CloudComputing-Strategy1.pdf [hereinafter FEDERAL CLOUD COMPUTING STRATEGY].
66
See Steven VanRoekel, The Changing Role of Federal Chief Information Officers,
THE WHITE HOUSE (Aug. 8, 2011, 6:22 PM), whitehouse.gov/blog/2011/08/08/changingrole-federal-chief-information-officers.
67
See FEDERAL CLOUD COMPUTING STRATEGY, supra note 65, at 13.
68
Id.
69
Id. at 14.
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Cloud First utilizes the General Services Administration (“the
GSA”), the National Institute of Standards and Technology (the
“NIST”), the Department of Homeland Security (the “DHS”), and
the Office of Management and Budget (the “OMB”) to help
agencies “efficiently acquire cloud computing capabilities and
mitigate threats.”70 The NIST and the GSA are responsible for
creating cloud computing standards, giving guidance to the
agencies, and developing contracts with suppliers.71 The DHS is
responsible for monitoring security issues related to cloud
computing.72 To coordinate all of these agencies and offices, the
OMB provides guidance as the agencies transition to cloud
computing.73
Additionally, Cloud First mandates that agencies form
contracts with private technology companies.74 To streamline the
approval process for cloud service providers, the government plans
to use an “approve once and use often” approach.75 Besides big
players in the cloud service provider industry—Amazon, Dell,
Microsoft, and Google—there are many smaller private technology
companies that have contracted with the government to develop
the cloud computing industry.76 Each CIO has a massive IT
budget to fund the transition to cloud computing.77 For example,
the Honorable Roger Baker, the CIO for the Department of
Veteran Affairs, currently operates a three billion dollar budget,
largely supporting the health and benefits administration.78
C. U.S. Jurisdictional Policies and the Effect of these Policies on
Cloud Computing
The dynamic nature of the cloud computing industry creates a
system in which data originating in one country passes through and
is stored within several foreign jurisdictions, sometimes
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78

Id. at 25.
See id. at 31.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 16.
Id. at 28.
See Rauf, supra note 62.
See FEDERAL CLOUD COMPUTING STRATEGY, supra note 65, at 35.
Transparency and Federal Management IT Systems, supra note 4, at 17.
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simultaneously.79 As the SWIFT incident demonstrated earlier, the
multi-jurisdictional nature of cloud computing creates issues for
determining what state or country may have access to data stored
on a server. Courts must determine the law that should apply when
resolving cloud computing disputes and, as a threshold matter,
whether the court can even hear the dispute.80 The Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure dictate that a court must be able to exercise
personal jurisdiction over a defendant for that defendant to be
properly brought before the court.81 Once in court, choice of law
principles govern which law applies: the law of the state in which
the subject of the lawsuit occurred, or that of the state in which the
court sits.82
1. U.S. Personal Jurisdiction
In the United States, personal jurisdiction is governed by the
U.S. Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment. The Due Process Clause prevents any
State from “depriv[ing] any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law.”83 Due process protects a person’s
right “to be subject only to lawful power,” which includes
protecting litigants from having to defend lawsuits in arbitrary
locations.84 To assert jurisdiction over an out-of-state corporation,
the Court held in International Shoe Co. v. Washington that due
process requires (1) that the defendant have certain minimum
contacts with the forum state and (2) that compelling the defendant

79

Kristina Irion, Government Cloud Computing and the Policies of Data Sovereignty,
22ND EUROPEAN REGIONAL CONFERENCE OF THE INTERNATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS
SOCIETY 10 (Sept. 18–21, 2011), https://www.econstor.eu/dspace/bitstream/10419/
52197/1/672481146.pdf.
80
See VILLASENOR, supra note 26, at 2 (stating that “the cloud raises complex policy
questions of security . . . privacy . . . and jurisdiction . . . [and that] [i]f data that falls
within a category subject to U.S. export control regulations ends up on a server in
Europe, the question of whether or not a violation of U.S. export control laws has
occurred will often turn in large part on the question of whether that data travelled there
from the United States”).
81
See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(2).
82
Christopher A. Whytock, Myth of Mess? International Choice of Law in Action, 84
N.Y.U. L. REV. 719, 724 (2009).
83
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
84
J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2789 (2011).
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to defend in that state would not “offend traditional notions of fair
play and substantial justice.”85 Hence, a defendant’s actions, not
his expectations, give a state’s courts jurisdiction over him.86
Since International Shoe, the Court has differentiated between
specific jurisdiction and general jurisdiction.87 A court has
“specific jurisdiction” over a defendant when the suit “aris[es] out
of or [is] related to the defendant’s contacts with the forum.”88
Specific jurisdiction includes purposeful availment, in which a
defendant has conducted activity within a state and has thus
invoked the benefits and protections of that state’s laws.89 A
state’s court has general jurisdiction over a defendant when,
although the suit did not “aris[e] out of [and is not] related to the
defendant’s contacts with the forum,”90 the defendant has had
“continuous and systematic” contacts with the state that “render
[him] essentially at home in the forum State.”91
2. Personal Jurisdiction over the Internet and Through Data
Servers
The Supreme Court has found that technological advancements
call for the redefinition of traditional personal jurisdiction
doctrine.92 In Hanson v. Denckla, Chief Justice Earl Warren stated
that “as technological progress has increased the flow of commerce
between States, the need for jurisdiction over nonresidents has
85
Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (quoting Milliken v. Meyer,
311 U.S. 457, 463). International Shoe Co. was a Delaware corporation with its principal
place of business in St. Louis, Missouri. Id. at 313. International Shoe Co. hired
salesmen who resided in Washington. Id. Washington State brought a suit against
International Shoe Co. in Washington state court to recover unpaid contributions to state
unemployment compensation fund. Id. at 311–12.
86
J. McIntyre Mach., 131 S. Ct. at 2790 (“[The] facts may reveal an intent to serve the
U.S. market, but they do not show that J. McIntyre purposefully availed itself of the New
Jersey market.”).
87
Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 n.8 (1984).
88
Id.
89
Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958) (“[I]t is essential in each case that
there be some act by which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of
conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of
its laws.”).
90
Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 415 n.9.
91
Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2851 (2011).
92
Hanson, 357 U.S. at 250–51.
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undergone a similar increase.”93 At first lower courts struggled to
establish jurisdictional boundaries within the Internet’s virtual
space. In Bensusan Restaurant Corp. v. King, Second Circuit
Judge Van Graafeiland stated, “attempting to apply established [ ]
law in the fast-developing world of the internet is somewhat like
trying to board a moving bus.”94 However, as Internet transactions
have developed into a distinct business and social marketplace,
there has been an increasing amount of judicial precedent as to the
ways a court can establish jurisdiction based on a user’s Internet
activities.95
Many courts have found that server location—where the
processing of information occurs—implicates a valid state
interest.96 For example, in 2007, the Eastern District of Virginia,
in a union dispute case over e-mails sent to Verizon, held that the
location of the corporation’s data server, along with the location of
some of its employees who received the e-mails, was sufficient to
establish jurisdiction in Virginia.97 In 2012, the Second Circuit
explored the question of whether a Connecticut court could
exercise jurisdiction over a defendant who, while living and
working in Canada, accessed a computer data server in

93

Id.
126 F.3d 25, 27 (2d Cir. 1997).
95
See, e.g., Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119, 1124 (W.D.
Pa. 1997) (applying a sliding-scale test of commercial interactivity to measure an Internet
user’s level of engagement with a particular website, which essentially established a
threshold for whether a user has “purposefully availed” themselves to a state based on
their Internet activity). The Western District of Pennsylvania created the Zippo test in
response to the jurisdictional problems created by the Internet. See id. Many circuit
courts rely on the Zippo test for guidance in determining when a court can properly claim
specific jurisdiction over a user. See e.g., Best Van Lines, Inc. v. Walker, 490 F.3d 239,
251 (2d Cir. 2007) (“In analyzing personal jurisdiction in the internet context, many
courts have turned to the standards set out more than ten years ago by a judge of the
Western District of Pennsylvania in Zippo . . . .”); Toys “R” Us, Inc. v. Step Two, S.A.,
318 F.3d 446, 452 (3d Cir. 2003) (describing Zippo as the “seminal authority regarding
personal jurisdiction based upon the operation of an Internet web site”); ALS Scan, Inc.
v. Digital Serv. Consultants, Inc., 293 F.3d 707, 713 (4th Cir. 2002) (adopting the Zippo
test).
96
Joel R. Reidenberg, Technology and Internet Jurisdiction, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 1951,
1962 (2005).
97
See Aitken v. Commc’ns Workers of Am., 496 F. Supp. 2d 653, 659 (E.D. Va.
2007).
94
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Connecticut in connection with illegal activity.98 The District
Court had dismissed the complaint for lack of personal
jurisdiction.99 The Second Circuit held that jurisdiction is
“reasonable” as the defendant “purposefully availed herself of the
privilege of conducting activities within Connecticut” and “[i]t is
not material that [the defendant] was outside of Connecticut when
she accessed the . . . servers.”100
When U.S. courts try to establish jurisdiction over international
cases, it is difficult to establish proper jurisdiction because United
States laws often conflict with the laws of other countries. In
Yahoo! Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme et L’antisemitisme
(“LICRA”), the Ninth Circuit heard a case that involved both U.S.
and French law.101 At the time of the suit, Yahoo was incorporated
in Delaware, had data servers in California, and foreign
subsidiaries in France, the UK, and India.102 The website
Yahoo.com provided a user platform for Nazi discussions and
auction information.103 Activity such as this is unlawful under the
French Criminal Code, which bans the exhibition and sale of Nazi
propaganda.104 LICRA sent a cease and desist letter to Yahoo in
France, ordering Yahoo to take the Nazi paraphernalia off the
Internet.105 The letter was followed by interim orders from a
French court demanding that Yahoo remove the anti-Semitic
content from its website.106 The French court held Yahoo liable
under the French penal code because the illegal content was viewed
in France.107 Yahoo argued that it did not have the technology to
remove the content from its French site without affecting its U.S.
site.108

98
99
100
101
102
103
104
105
106
107
108

MacDermid, Inc. v. Deiter, 702 F.3d 725, 726–27 (2d Cir. 2012).
Id. at 727.
Id. at 729–30.
See 433 F.3d 1199, 1201 (9th Cir. 2006).
Id. at 1201–02.
Id. at 1202.
See id. at 1221.
Id. at 1232 (Tashima, J., concurring).
Id.
Id. at 1225 (Ferguson, J., concurring).
Id. at 1203.
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Yahoo reacted by filing suit in a U.S. district court, claiming
that the French interim orders were not enforceable in the United
States.109 Yahoo alleged that LICRA could not hold Yahoo liable
in the United States due to First Amendment protections.110 The
U.S. district court found that the decision by the French court was
inconsistent with the First Amendment to the Constitution, and
therefore, the French court’s decision was inapplicable in the
United States.111
LICRA then appealed the case to the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit.112 Ultimately, the Ninth Circuit reversed
portions of the earlier holding but maintained that the U.S. district
court had personal jurisdiction over the French defendants.113 The
French court order was left unenforced despite the violation of
Yahoo then decided to remove the Nazi
French law.114
paraphernalia from its website entirely.115 This is just one example
of the United States’ problem of territorial jurisdiction when
conflicts involving international law arise.116
3. Choice of Law Doctrine as Applied in the United States
Choice of law is the doctrine used to determine which body of
law applies in a dispute between parties from different states or
countries.117 As the SWIFT incident demonstrated, when the EU
had a conflict with the United States regarding international
financial data, it became unclear which jurisdiction would govern
109

Id. at 1204.
Id. at 1206.
111
Id. at 1204–05.
112
Id. at 1205.
113
See id. at 1201.
114
See id. (“The district court held that . . . the French orders are not enforceable in the
United States because such enforcement would violate the First Amendment. . . . LICRA
and UEJF appeal only the personal jurisdiction, ripeness, and abstention holdings.”).
115
Susan Dodson, The Very Long Arm of the Law, THE GUARDIAN (Nov. 9, 2001, 1:15
PM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/2001/nov/09/internetnews.
116
See Joel R. Reidenberg, Yahoo and Democracy on the Internet, 42 JURIMETRICS J.
261, 271 (“The cases reveal that, to the extent that an Internet actor strives to target users
in a foreign jurisdiction, the foreign forum can assert territorial jurisdiction and apply the
forum’s law. While a number of the cases involved protecting the intellectual property of
parties in the forum, the vice cases illustrate that the principle applies equally to issues of
public order. Courts assert territorial jurisdiction to protect values held in the forum.”).
117
Whytock, supra note 82, at 724.
110
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the dispute. Ultimately, the United States negotiated an agreement
with the EU, leaving this issue undecided.118
Choice of law issues are critical in the cloud computing context
as many service providers use data replication to store the same
information in many jurisdictions.
This practice creates
uncertainty as to which law would apply; however, the problem
can be ameliorated with a simple choice of law provision in the
underlying contract.
The U.S. Constitution requires a state to enforce proceedings of
other states, limit the jurisdiction of a state’s courts, prevent a state
from discriminating against citizens of another state, give effect to
the Constitution, statutes, and treaties of the United States, and
limit a state’s power to apply local law in interstate commerce.119
There is no uniform choice of law rule in the United States;
instead, each state has its own choice of law provisions.120 Some
states mandate that the law where an incident occurred governs the
case, while other states always use their own laws.121
Today, due to the different state or international laws that can
be involved in a single contract, many contracts include a choice of
law provision that dictates what law will apply should a contract
dispute arise.122 The Restatement of Conflict of Laws permits
contracting parties to choose a governing law, but if the contract

118
See Terrorist Finance Tracking Center, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY (last visited
Mar. 16, 2013), http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/terrorist-illicit-finance/TerroristFinance-Tracking/Pages/tftp.aspx (“At the end of 2009 SWIFT stopped storing certain
sets of these critical data on its U.S. servers and hosts those data in the European Union.
The United States negotiated an agreement with the European Union on the processing
and transfer of this information to the U.S. Treasury Department. The Agreement became
effective on August 1, 2010.”).
119
See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
120
Whytock, supra note 82, at 724.
121
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6 cmt. b (1971) (“The court
should give a local statute the range of application intended by the legislature when these
intentions can be ascertained and can constitutionally be given effect. If the legislature
intended that the statute should be applied to the out-of-state facts involved, the court
should so apply it unless constitutional considerations forbid. On the other hand, if the
legislature intended that the statute should be applied only to acts taking place within the
state, the statute should not be given a wider range of application.”).
122
See id. at cmt. g (“[T]he parties are free within broad limits to choose the law to
govern the validity of their contract.”).
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does not cover a particular issue, there are opportunities for parties
to circumvent the choice-of law provisions.123
These choice-of-law provisions are prevalent in business and
government contracts. Public cloud computing companies like
Amazon, Microsoft, Rackspace, and Google—as well as private
companies such as Eucalyptus—require anyone who uses their
services to agree to contracts governing technology services.124
Many of the contracts between the service providers and users who
purchase these services include choice-of-law provisions. For
example, Amazon Web Service mandates that:
The laws of the State of Washington, without
reference to conflict of law rules, govern this
Agreement and any dispute of any sort that might
arise between you and us. Any dispute relating in
any way to the Service Offerings or this Agreement
where a party seeks aggregate relief of $7,500 or
more will be adjudicated in any state or federal
court in King County, Washington. You consent to
exclusive jurisdiction and venue in those courts.125
This contract essentially requires that any cloud computing
dispute must be resolved in Washington State, even if the user is
located in different part of the world.

123
See id. (“There are occasions, particularly in the area of negligence, when the parties
act without giving thought to the legal consequences of their conduct or to the law that
may be applied. In such situations, the parties have no justified expectations to protect,
and this factor can play no part in the decision of a choice-of-law question.”).
124
See Timothy J. Calloway, Cloud Computing, Clickwrap Agreements, and Limitation
on Liability Clauses: A Perfect Storm?, 11 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 163, 163 (discussing
the negative effect that cloud provider clickwrap agreements could have on the cloud
computing industry); see, e.g., Cloud Glossary, EUCALYPTUS, http://www.eucalyptus.
com/resources/ cloud-overview/cloud-glossary#q13 (“[A Service Level Agreement is a]
contract, typically between a service provider and a service client, that stipulates the
minimum quality of service the client will receive, the units and measurement
methodology that will be used to audit service quality, and the time frame over which it
will be measured.”); Sample Business Contract, ONE CLE, http://contracts.onecle.
com/gomez/ rackspace-services-2007-03-30.shtml. See generally Lynn Greiner & Lauren
Gibbons Paul, SLA Definitions and Solutions, CIO, http://www.cio.com/article/
128900/SLA_Definitions_and_Solutions.
125
AWS CUSTOMER AGREEMENT, § 13.11, AMAZON WEB SERVICES, available at
http://aws.amazon.com/agreement (last updated Aug. 23, 2011).
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By analyzing the policies that affect cloud computing, one can
see how critical location becomes in the legal context. Courts’
own rules, which typically exercise jurisdiction through data center
location, are often in direct contrast to choice-of-law provisions
that govern in which state the issue must be litigated. Although
courts respect choice-of-law provisions, lawyers can easily find
loopholes in these contracts and bring suit in a location in which
the data server sits.
D. International Provisions Regulating Data and Privacy
Conflict-of-law issues in the Internet context are aggravated by
the fact that data is regulated differently throughout the world. If a
corporation stores data in a cloud that has data servers in a foreign
country, the law of that country may govern its data. Depending
on the foreign country in which one’s data is stored, the foreign
country’s law may affect 1) the privacy of your data and 2)
whether that foreign country’s government or police can access
your data. In the European Union (EU), the laws on data privacy
are highly developed and broad directives regulate data.126 This is
a result of the structure of the European political system and the
view of privacy as a fundamental right, equal, if not superior, to
economic rights.127 In Asia, many countries have started to host
data centers, but individual government attempts to regulate the
industry are not as expansive as those in Europe.128
1. European Union Legislation Regulating Data
The European Commission, the executive body of the
European Union (“EU”), represents the interests of the EU and

126

Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October
1995, on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data
and on the Free Movement of such Data, arts. 2-4 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31, 31 (EC)
[hereinafter Directive 95/46/EC].
127
Eric Pfanner, Guarding a “Fundamental Right” of Privacy in Europe, N.Y. TIMES
(Nov.
20,
2012),
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/21/technology/guarding-afundamental-right-of-privacy-in-europe.html (“‘In Europe, we consider privacy a
fundamental right,’ [French privacy regulator, Isabelle Falque-Pierrotin] said. ‘That
doesn’t mean it is exclusive of other rights, but economic rights are not superior to
privacy.’”).
128
Compare infra Part I.D.2 with Part I.D.1.
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proposes legislation to the European Parliament and the European
Council.129 The European Commission is also responsible for
administering and implementing EU policies and negotiating
international matters.130
There are two major pieces of EU legislation that affect data:
the Data Protection Directive 95/46/EC131 and the proposed
General Data Protection Regulation.132 Since directives are the
European form of legislation addressed to EU Member States,133
each Member State is responsible for incorporating every directive
into its own legal system, but the directive may still have legal
force even if the member state has elected not enforced all of its
provisions.134
Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament discusses the
protection of individuals with respect to the processing of personal
data.135 The Directive’s recitals generally “explain the background
to the legislation and the aims and objectives of the legislation.”136
Recitals (6)–(8) and (20) specifically provide objectives for the
cross-border flow of data,137 while Recitals (42)–(44) govern the

129

About this Site, EUROPEAN COMMISSION, http://ec.europa.eu/about_en.htm (last
updated Nov. 16, 2012).
130
Id.
131
Directive 95/46/EC, supra note 126.
132
Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the
Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the
Free Movement of such Data (General Data Protection Regulation), COM (2012) 11
final (Jan. 25, 2012) [hereinafter General Data Protection Regulation].
133
DATA PROTECTION IN THE EUROPEAN UNION, EUROPA, at 4, available at
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/policies/privacy/docs/guide/guide-ukingdom_en.pdf
(last
visited Mar. 7, 2013).
134
Id.
135
See Directive 95/46/EC, supra note 126. The Directive defines “personal data” as
“any information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person (‘data subject’);
an identifiable person is one who can be identified, directly or indirectly, in particular by
reference to an identification number or to one or more factors specific to his physical,
physiological, mental, economic, cultural or social identity.” Id.
136
Guide to the Approximation of European Union Environmental Legislation: Annex
I: How To Interpret EU Environmental Legislation, EUROPEAN COMMISSION,
http://ec.europa.eu/environment/archives/guide/annex1.htm (last updated March 2, 2012).
137
Directive 95/46/EC, supra note 126, at 31–33.
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conditions that allow the member states in the EU to restrict access
to information.138
Further, the Directive addresses the free movement of personal
data.139 Recitals (56)–(58) require that, to transfer personal data to
a third party country outside of the EU, the country must attain an
“adequate level of protection.”140 Hence, the EU does not allow
cloud computing data servers to be located outside of the EU
unless the adequacy standards are met.141 Although this Directive
was enacted in 1995, it continues to help limit European data from
third party access.
On January 25, 2012, the European Commission announced a
proposal to create a General Data Protection Regulation (the “Data
Protection Regulation”).142 The Data Protection Regulation will
differ from past directives because it will be immediately
applicable to all member states, and will impose fines if member
states do not comply.143 The regulation will affect data processors
and cross-border data transfers.144

138

Id. at 35.
Id. at 31.
140
Id. at 36–37. Specifically, it states that “the transfer to a third country of personal
data which are undergoing processing or are intended for processing after transfer,” may
only take place if the country has an “adequate level of protection. Id. at 38; see also
Welcome to the U.S.-EU & U.S.-Swiss Safe Harbor Frameworks, EXPORT.GOV,
http://export.gov/safeharbor/ (last updated Apr. 11, 2012).
141
See Commission Decisions on the Adequacy of the Protection of Personal Data in
COMMISSION,
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/dataThird
Countries,
EUROPEAN
protection/document/international-transfers/adequacy/index_en.htm (last updated Feb.
11, 2013 ). As of February 11, 2013, the Commission has recognized Andorra,
Argentina, Australia, Canada, Switzerland, Faeroe Islands, Guernsey, State of Israel, Isle
of Man, Jersey, the U.S. Department of Commerce’s Safe Harbor Privacy Principles, and
the transfer of Air Passenger Name Record to the United States’ Bureau of Customs and
Border Protection as providing adequate protection. Id.
142
General Data Protection Regulation, supra note 132.
143
Jane Finlayson-Brown, How to Prepare for Proposed EU Data Protection
http://www.computerweekly.com/opinion/
Regulation,
COMPUTERWEEKLY.COM,
Proposed-EU-Data-Protection-Regulation-what-should-companies-be-thinking-about
(last visited March 17, 2013).
144
Id.
139
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2. Asian Governments’ Approach to Regulating Data
Asian countries that currently host data centers have taken
different approaches to regulating cloud computing than the U.S.
and the EU. Some Asian countries’ laws permit government
access to data within the data server that is sitting on its
territory.145 This policy creates legal privacy issues when third
party contractors, such as Google or Amazon, have other
countries’ data stored in data servers within these countries.
In Japan, the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications
(MIC) regulates the cloud computing industry.146 The Global ICT
Policy Division of the MIC created a strategy for promoting the
cloud computing industry both within Japan, through the
development of
the Kasumigaseki Cloud and the Local
Government Cloud,147 and internationally, through the
development of “new cloud solutions in cooperation with Asian
countries.”148 In November 2011, the Japanese government stated
that in the future, it plans to address the following international
issues: “[j]urisdiction over databases stored in other countries (e.g.
privacy protection act),” “[d]ispute settlement mechanism[s],”
“[c]ountermeasures against ‘harmful’ information,” “[the]
[p]ossibility of government intervention with respect to privatesector data,” and “[o]wnership of [intellectual property rights]
regarding data stored on a cloud data center in other countries.”149
India’s approach to investments and regulations in cloud
computing technology has been delayed due to government
uncertainty over data security and privacy.150 Despite the

145

See Carol Ko, Cloud Legal Issues III: Data Privacy Laws in Asia, ASIA CLOUD
FORUM,
http://www.asiacloudforum.com/content/cloud-legal-issues-iii-data-privacylaws-asia (last visited Mar. 17, 2013).
146
See YUMIKO MYOKEN, CLOUD COMPUTING IN JAPAN 3 (2009), available at
http://ukinjapan.fco.gov.uk/resources/en/pdf/5606907/5633632/cloud-computing-japan.
147
Kazutaka Nakamizo, Cloud Services in Japan, MINISTRY OF INTERNAL AFFAIRS AND
COMMUNICATIONS, JAPAN, 6 (2011), http://www.soumu.go.jp/main_sosiki/joho_tsusin/
eng/presentation/pdf/111102_1.pdf.
148
Id.
149
Id. at 8.
150
Rahul Sachitanand, Indian CIOs’ Cloud Concerns, TIMES OF INDIA (Jan. 5, 2012,
12:31
PM),
http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2012-01-05/servicesapps/30592821_1_cloud-server-data.
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uncertainty, the government continues to allow companies to place
their data servers within its borders.151 India’s Information
Technology Act of 2000 governs the privacy rights accorded to
data servers. Provision 69 reads:
If the Controller is satisfied that it is necessary or
expedient so to do in the interest of the sovereignty
or integrity of India, the security of the State,
friendly relations with foreign Stales or public order
or for preventing incitement to the commission of
any cognizable offence, for reasons to be recorded
in writing, by order, direct any agency of the
Government to intercept any information
transmitted through any computer resource.
This provision allows the government to intercept data located
in data servers within its territory.
Independently, Asian countries are trying to determine how to
attract private corporations to build technology and cloud
computing entities in their respective countries, while at the same
time trying to regulate the growing industry and determine how
much access they are going to give local police to the data servers
on their territory.
3. International Treaties that Affect Cloud Computing
Technology
The Budapest Convention on Cybercrime was the first
international treaty addressing Computer and Internet Crime.152
When the U.S. Senate ratified the treaty in August 2006, thenSenate Majority Leader Bill Frist commented, “[w]hile balancing
civil liberty and privacy concerns, this treaty encourages the
sharing of critical electronic evidence among foreign countries so
that law enforcement can more effectively investigate and combat
these crimes.”153

151

See id.
See Convention on Cybercrime, Nov. 23, 2001, C.E.T.S. No. 185, available at
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/Html/185.htm.
153
US Ratifies Treaty On Cybercrime, IOL NEWS (Aug. 5, 2006, 12:06 PM),
http://www.iol.co.za/news/world/us-ratifies-treaty-on-cybercrime-1.288245.
152
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Article 19 of the Budapest Convention, entitled “Search and
seizure of stored computer data,” requires each Party to the treaty
to adopt legislation permitting its “competent authorities” to access
data servers in its territories without permission of the owner of
information, and clause 3 provides local authorities permission to
seize, remove, or make copies of the computer data.154 Article 22,
which discusses jurisdiction, mandates that each Party establish
jurisdiction over any computer-related offense, when the offense is
either committed in its territory or by one of its nationals.155
Further, jurisdiction over offenses committed in its territory cannot
be waived.156 If two or more Parties claim jurisdiction over any
offense listed in the Convention, “the Parties involved shall, where
appropriate, consult with a view to determining the most
appropriate jurisdiction for prosecution.”157
The Council of Europe has attempted to review the decisions
made during the Budapest Convention because of the widespread
use of cloud computing and the urgent need for increased
international co-operation.158 The United States and the EU refuse
to draft another treaty on cybercrime, despite international growth
of cross-border cybercrime.159
At the Twelfth UN Congress on Crime Prevention and
Criminal Justice in 2010, countries met to discuss prevention and
response to Cybercrime.160 The United States, the EU, and other
governing bodies that supported the Budapest Convention rejected

154

Convention on Cybercrime, supra note 152, at art. 19.
Id. at art. 22(1).
156
Id. at art. 22(2) (“Each Party may reserve the right not to apply or to apply only in
specific cases or conditions the jurisdiction rules laid down in paragraphs 1.b through 1.d
of this article or any part thereof.”).
157
Id. at art. 22(5).
158
See UN Rejects International Cybercrime Treaty, COMPUTERWEEKLY.COM (Apr. 20,
2010, 3:44 PM), http://www.computerweekly.com/news/1280092617/UN-rejectsinternational-cybercrime-treaty (“Cloud computing trends in particular have led the
Council of Europe to open a review of the Budapest Convention.”).
159
Id.
160
Twelfth United Nations Congress on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice,
Salvador, Braz., Apr. 12–19, 2010, 12th United Nations Congress on Crime Prevention
and Criminal Justice Opens Today, U.N. Doc. UNIS/CP/601 (Apr. 12, 2010), available
at http://www.un.org/en/conf/crimecongress2010/pdf/pr100412-2.pdf.
155
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Russia and China’s proposal for a new Cybercrime treaty.161 Both
the United States and the EU asked for more stringent privacy
protections in the Budapest Convention to protect against “overzealous” police intervention into cloud computing data servers
stored in other countries.162
II. LEGAL ANALYSIS
As demonstrated above, countries approach differently the
question of how best to regulate the burgeoning cloud computing
industry and whether there should be cross-country restrictions on
data.163 Scholars who have studied cloud computing, as well
representatives of the cloud computing industry, are divided on
how the government should regulate the industry in the future. As
demonstrated in the introduction, the location of data has broad
implications regarding who can access the data and which
countries’ laws regulate access to information. This Part first
presents the tension between U.S. and EU policy and law regarding
cloud computing, then explores competing legal theories on the
future regulation of cloud computing technology.
A. The U.S. Government’s Approach to Regulating Cloud
Computing Technology
In the United States, privacy and technology law is sectorspecific and is governed by a varying blend of legislation,
regulation, and self-regulation.164 As will be seen, this blended
approach presents unique challenges as the United States seeks to
strike the proper regulatory balance.

161
See Conflict Over Proposed United Nations Cybercrime Treaty,
COMPUTERWEEKLY.COM, (Apr. 15, 2010, 10:44 AM), http://www.computerweekly.com/
news/1280092581/Conflict-over-proposed-United-Nations-cybercrime-treaty.
162
UN Rejects International Cybercrime Treaty, supra note 158.
163
See Patrick Baillie, Can European Firms Legally Use U.S. Clouds To Store Data?,
FORBES (Jan. 2, 2012, 6:05 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/ciocentral/2012/01/02/caneuropean-firms-legally-use-u-s-clouds-to-store-data/ (describing the main differences
between U.S. and EU law).
164
See
U.S.-EU
Safe
Harbor
Overview,
EXPORT.GOV,
http://export.gov/safeharbor/eu/eg_main_018476.asp (last updated Apr. 26, 2012).
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1. Governing Cloud Computing Through Legislation
Legislation governing cloud computing is tailored to the
consumer and the industry. The data privacy rules of the Health
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA), for
example, are vastly different from those in the Gramm-LeachBliley Act (GLBA), which regulates the financial sector.165
HIPAA places heavy restrictions on agreements with cloud service
providers and mandates that parties enter into a business associate
contract to protect private patient information.166 The GLBA, in
contrast, requires that financial institutions enter into strict
contracts with service providers, prohibiting the service provider
from disclosing user information except under specific
circumstances.167
The U.S. Patriot Act, originally developed as a response to the
September 11, 2001 terrorism acts, is one of the only laws that
affects the entire cloud computing industry. Under the Act, a U.S.based cloud service provider is subject to rules requiring it to turn
over user information.168 Section 217 states, “[i]t shall not be
unlawful . . . for a person . . . to intercept the wire or electronic
communications of a computer trespasser transmitted to, through,
or from the protected computer” if 1) the owner of the computer
165

Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1341 (1999) (“An Act [t]o
enhance competition in the financial services industry by providing a prudential
framework for the affiliation of banks, securities firms, insurance companies, and other
financial service providers . . . .”).
166
See, e.g., Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-191, § 264, 110 Stat. 1936; LISA J. SOTTO, BRIDGET C. TREACY & MELINDA L.
MCLELLAN, PRIVACY AND DATA SECURITY RISKS IN CLOUD COMPUTING, 2–3 (2010).
167
SOTTO, ET AL., supra note 166, at 2; see Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, BUREAU OF
CONSUMER PROTECTION BUSINESS CENTER, http://business.ftc.gov/privacy-andsecurity/gramm-leach-bliley-act (last visited Mar. 17, 2013).
168
Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT ACT) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 10756, § 217, 115 Stat. 272 (“It shall not be unlawful under this chapter for a person acting
under color of law to intercept the wire or electronic communications of a computer
trespasser transmitted to, through, or from the protected computer . . . .”) [hereinafter
Patriot Act]; Sean Gallager, PATRIOT Act and Privacy Laws Take a Bite Out of US
Cloud Business, ARS TECHNICA (Dec. 8, 2011, 8:49 AM), http://arstechnica.com/techpolicy/news/2011/12/patriot-act-and-privacy-laws-take-a-bite-out-of-us-cloudbusiness.ars (discussing Microsoft’s inability to guarantee that its client’s data wouldn’t
leave Europe).
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authorizes the “interception of the computer trespasser’s
communications on the protected computer”; 2) the person is
engaged in an investigation; 3) the person “has reasonable grounds
to believe that the contents of the computer trespasser’s
communications will be relevant to the investigation”; and 4)
“such interception does not acquire communications other than
those transmitted to or from the computer trespasser.”169
Many members of government have recognized the sweeping
effect of the U.S. Patriot Act. Steven M. Martinez, while Deputy
Assistant Director of the FBI’s Cyber Division, addressed the U.S.
House of Representatives Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, and
Homeland Security in Washington, D.C. on April 21, 2005.170 He
testified that:
Section 220 [of the Patriot Act] enables federal
courts—with jurisdiction over an investigation—to
issue a search warrant to compel the production of
information (such as unopened e-mail) that is stored
with a service provider located outside their district.
The practical effect of this section is that our FBI
Agents are no longer limited to applying for a
search warrant solely from the court that sits where
the service provider happens to be located.171
Section 220 broadly expands the power of the government to
access information stored within data servers on U.S. soil as well
as internationally.
Private corporations are required to comply with the Patriot
Act.172 According to a Forbes article in January 2012, “[b]oth
Amazon Web Services and Microsoft have recently acknowledged
that they would comply with U.S. government requests to release
data stored in their European clouds, even though those clouds are
located outside of direct U.S. jurisdiction and would conflict with
169

Patriot Act, supra note 168.
Steven M. Martinez, Deputy Assistant Director, Cyber Division, Federal Bureau of
Investigation, Testimony at the Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland
Security (Apr. 21, 2005), available at http://www.fbi.gov/news/testimony/computerprovisions-of-the-usa-patriot-act.
171
Id.
172
See Patriot Act, supra note 168, at § 1016.
170
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European laws.”173 The strict requirements of the Patriot Act have
caused several countries overseas to enact laws that restrict
electronic data flow within their borders.174 By restricting data
flow to servers within their borders, the United States could not
obtain proper jurisdiction to access their information.
2. Governing Cloud Computing Through Regulation
United States government agencies are attempting to selfregulate their IT practices, including the circumstances under
which cloud computing can operate and serve as a tool to the
government, while also complying with the Cloud First Policy.
The U.S. agencies involved in export controls, or the trans-border
restriction of data, have led the self-regulation movement in the
cloud computing context.175 The Departments of State, the
Treasury, Energy, Defense, and the Interior, the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission, the Environmental Protection Agency,
the Food and Drug Administration, and other government
organizations all govern export controls.176
The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) is
the agency within the Department of Commerce that assists in
regulating the technology industry.177
The Information
Technology Laboratory (ITL) is a branch of NIST tasked with
promoting “U.S. innovation and industrial competitiveness by
advancing measurement science, standards, and technology.”178
The ITL has released for public comment two proposed roadmaps
that “define[] high-priority requirements for standards, official
guidance and technology developments that need to be met in
order for agencies to accelerate their migration of existing IT

173

Baillie, supra note 163.
See, e.g., David Saleh Rauf, PATRIOT Act Clouds Picture for Tech, POLITICO (Nov.
29, 2011, 11:17 PM), http://www.politico.com/news/stories/1111/69366_Page2.html.
175
See VILLASENOR, supra note 26, at 1–2.
176
United States Government Departments and Agencies with Export Control
Responsibilities, BUREAU OF INDUSTRY & SECURITY, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE,
http://www.bis.doc.gov/about/reslinks.htm (last visited Mar. 17, 2013).
177
About NIST, NIST (Aug. 18, 2009), http://www.nist.gov/public_affairs/nandyou.cfm
(last updated Apr. 18, 2012).
178
What ITL Does, NIST (Jan. 7, 2010), http://www.nist.gov/itl/what-itl-does.cfm (last
updated Jan. 25, 2011).
174
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systems to the cloud computing model.”179 While the roadmaps
discuss security requirements, there are no substantive rules that
regulate where data can be stored or how data can pass between
borders.
The General Services Administration (“GSA”) is the Federal
Agency that oversees the business side of the federal
government.180 Part of the responsibility of the GSA includes
managing federal buildings, building public trust in the
government, as well as selecting “high-quality, low-cost goods and
services” available for purchase by the federal government’s
agencies and employees.181 When the GSA received $2.5 billion
in 2011 to spend on cloud e-mail services for federal employees,
private technology companies tried to contract with the GSA to
provide these services.182
In October 2011, two contracting firms that provide cloud
computing services, Technosource Information Systems and
TrueTandem, filed protests with the Government Accountability
Office (“GAO”) over the fact that the GSA required all data
centers to either be located in the United States,183 or in designated
countries as defined by Federal Acquisition Regulation (“FAR”)

179
Draft Roadmap for Cloud Computing Technology, NIST (Nov. 8, 2011),
http://www.nist.gov/itl/cloud-110811.cfm.
180
Background and History, U.S. GEN. SERVS. ADMIN., http://www.gsa.gov/portal/
content/ 104774 (last updated Feb. 14, 2013).
181
A Brief History of GSA, U.S. GEN. SERVS. ADMIN., http://www.gsa.gov/portal/
content/103369 (last updated Feb. 25, 2013).
182
See Alice Lipowicz, GSA Launches $2.5B Cloud Computing Procurement,
WASHINGTON TECHNOLOGY (May 10, 2011), http://washingtontechnology.com/articles/
2011/05/10/gsa-issues-rfq-for-cloud-computing-options.aspx; Ed O’Keefe & Majorie
Censer, Contract With Ties to Microsoft and Google Needs Change, GAO Says, WASH.
POST (Oct. 17, 2011, 3:10 PM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/contract-withties-to-microsoft-and-google-needs-changes-gao-says/2011/10/17/gIQAPktPsL_
story.html.
183
See Technosource Info. Servs., LLC, B-405296 et al., Comp. Gen. (2011), available
at http://www.gao.gov/decisions/bidpro/405296.pdf (“Technosource Information
Systems, LLC, or Annapolis, Maryland, and TrueTandem, LLC, of Reston, Virginia,
protest the terms of request for quotations . . . issued by the General Services
Administration . . . for cloud computing services.”).
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section 25.003.184 Essentially, this requirement allowed data
centers to be placed in war-torn “countries including Afghanistan,
Yemen, and Somalia . . . but not in countries with developing tech
sectors” such as India.185 The GSA argued that the government
must know where its data is stored, “because when U.S.
government data crosses national borders, the governing legal,
privacy, and regulatory regimes become ambiguous and raise a
variety of concerns including the potential of foreign jurisdictions
to assert access rights to U.S. government data.”186
The GAO then held a hearing on this matter and asked the
GSA to explain its data center requirement.187 The GSA explained
that it had originally limited the location of data servers to the
United States, but compromised because the Office of
Management and Budget (the “OMB”) and the Office of the
United States Trade Representative (the “USTR”) advised the GSA
that the requirement would have “impermissibly restricted free
trade.”188 The contracting officer of the GSA admitted that the
agency did not have a list of countries it considered acceptable, so
the GSA limited the data centers to designated countries.189
The GAO concluded that the GSA requirements were
“established in an arbitrary manner” as the GSA acknowledged it
had “no basis to differentiate between countries with acceptable
data rights regulations and those with unacceptable data rights
regulations.”190 Additionally, the GAO found that “with regard to
GSA’s argument that the government has a need to know where
U.S. government data resides and transits, this objective is
accomplished by the requirement for vendors to identify the
locations of their data centers.”191 The GAO sustained the

184
See id. at 2 n.1 (“FAR § 25.003 defines ‘designated country’ to include a World
Trade Organization Government Procurement Agreement country, a Free Trade
Agreement country, a least developed country, or a Caribbean Basin country.”).
185
O’Keefe & Censer, supra note 182.
186
Technosource, supra note 183.
187
Id.
188
Id.
189
Id.
190
Id.
191
Id.
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protesters’ challenges, and recommended that the GSA amend the
terms of its contract requirements.192
In November 2011, the GSA again solicited bids for Email-asa-Service (“EaaS”) government contracts.193 This time the GSA
did not impose any location requirements and simply asked the
cloud computing service providers to identify where their data
centers are located.194
As of January 2013, GSA contracts are still subject to the
Trade Agreements Act, which requires that products “be
manufactured or ‘substantially transformed’ in a ‘designated
country.’”195 The designated country list, compiled by the
Department of State, allows data centers to be located even in
countries the government discourages Americans from traveling to,
such as Afghanistan, Burundi, Eritrea, Guinea, Honduras,
Mauritania, and Mexico.196
In November 2011, the U.S. Department of the Interior
publicly issued a request for information to identify cloud service
providers that are interested in providing cloud-based e-mail and
collaboration services for the Department.197
The request
expressed the Department’s preference that service providers keep
their data centers located in the United States.198

192

See id.
Email as a Service (EaaS), U.S. GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION,
http://www.gsa.gov/portal/content/112223; Nick Wakeman, GSA Restarts $2.5B E-Mail
Contract, WASHINGTON TECHNOLOGY (Nov. 30, 2011), http://washingtontechnology.
com/articles/2011/11/30/gsa-cloud-email-rfq.aspx.
194
TOM KIREILIS & GREG NORMAN, EMAIL AS A SERVICE (EAAS) BLANKET PURCHASE
AGREEMENT (BPA) REQUIREMENTS DOCUMENT 4, available at http://gsa.gov/portal/
getMediaData?mediaId=148887.
195
TAA Designated Countries, FEDERAL SCHEDULES, INC., http://gsa.federalschedules.
com/resource-center/resources/taa-designated-countries.aspx (last updated Feb. 2013).
196
Current Travel Warnings, TRAVEL.STATE.GOV, http://travel.state.gov/travel/
cis_pa_tw/tw/tw_1764.html (last visited Apr. 5, 2013).
197
Cloud E-Mail and Collaboration Services (CECS)—Request for Information,
Capabilities, and Sources Sought, FEDBIZOPPS.GOV (Oct. 28, 2011),
https://fbo.gov/index?s=opportunity&mode=form&id=1ebb0fdd2b3c0be3c3ac38872f669
d5b&tab=core&_cview=0.
198
THE DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR, CLOUD-BASED EMAIL AND COLLABORATION
SERVICES (CECS) STATEMENT OF WORK 22 (2011) (“The physical data centers for this
requirement must be located within the continental United States.”).
193
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In the United States, regulations governing cloud computing
vary across agency. Some agencies, such as the Department of
Commerce, are primarily concerned with a data server’s security
requirements, while other agencies, such as the GSA and the
Department of the Interior, have raised concerns about the location
of data servers, but have yet to create regulations.199
B. The EU’s Hard Line Approach to Regulating Cloud Computing
Conflicts with the United States’ Laissez-faire Approach
The EU’s Data Protection Directive 95/46/EC places strict
standards on governments that collect electronic data.200 Cloud
computing data that originates from the European Economic Area
(EEA) cannot be transferred to another country unless there is an
adequate level of data protection.201 The EU will find that a
country does not have an adequate level of protection if it
determines that the laws in the country in question, including
professional rules and security measures, do not adequately protect
data transfers.202 The United States is not one of the countries that
has a sufficient level of protection because of its weak data
protection and inconsistent data regulation.203
Countries that want to work with the EEA can develop
alternative legal options to meet the adequate level of protection
199

See infra part II.B.2.
William R. Denny, Survey of Recent Developments in the Law of Cloud Computing
and Software as a Service Agreement, 66 BUS. LAW. 237, 239 (2010).
201
SOTTO, supra note 166, at 4.
202
Directive 95/46/EC, supra note 127, at 45–46 (“The adequacy of the level of
protection afforded by a third country shall be assessed in the light of all the circumstance
surrounding a data transfer operation or set of data transfer operations; particular
consideration shall be given to the nature of the data, the purpose and duration of the
proposed processing operation or operations, the country of origin and country of final
destination, the rules of law, both general and sectoral, in force in the third country in
question and the professional rules and security measures which are complied with in that
country.”).
203
See Sending Personal Data Outside the European Economic Area (Principle 8),
INFORMATION COMMISSIONER’S OFFICE, http://www.ico.gov.uk/for_organisations/
data_protection/the_guide/principle_8.aspx (last visited Mar. 18, 2013). Despite not
being on the list of approved countries, the U.S. can still be sent personal data if “a US
company signs up to the Safe Harbor arrangement [and] agree[s] to: following seven
principles of information handling; and be held responsible for keeping to those
principles by the Federal Trade Commission or other oversight schemes.” Id.
200
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standard.204 For example, the U.S. Department of Commerce’s
Safe Harbor Program purports to align the strict EU Data
Protection Directive 95/46/EC with U.S. data privacy controls.205
Its goal is to provide a simpler mechanism for U.S. organizations
to comply with the EU directive, without U.S. organizations
having to follow each of the EU’s requirements.206
There are seven main Safe Harbor privacy requirements with
which an organization must comply to meet EU adequacy
standards.207 These include 1) Notice (“organizations must notify
individuals about the purposes for which they collect and use
information about them” and the types of third parties this
information is disclosed to); 2) Choice (organizations “must give
individuals the opportunity to choose” whether their information
will be disclosed to a third party or used for a purpose other than
the one the individuals agreed to); 3) Onward Transfer (to disclose
information to a third party, organizations must give notice and
choice); 4) Access (“individuals must have access to personal
information about them that an organization holds and be able to
correct, amend, or delete that information where it is inaccurate”
except where the burden of access is disproportionate to risks of
the individual’s privacy); 5) Security (organizations must protect
personal information from “loss, misuse and unauthorized access,
disclosure, alteration and destruction”); 6) Data Integrity
(“[p]ersonal information must be relevant for the purposes for
which it is to be used”); and 7) Enforcement (there must be
available and independent recourse mechanisms so each
individual’s complaints can be investigated and resolved,
procedures for verifying that companies that adhere to safe harbor
principles obligations to remedy problems of failure to comply,
The Department of
and sanctions for non-compliance).208
Commerce proclaimed that government agencies, the Federal
204

See, e.g., id. (“The Safe Harbor scheme is recognised by the European Commission
as providing adequate protection for the rights of data individuals in connection the [sic]
transfer of their personal data to signatories of the scheme in the USA.”).
205
U.S.-EU Safe Harbor Overview, EXPORT.GOV, http://export.gov/safeharbor/eu/
eg_main_018476.asp (last updated Apr. 26, 2012).
206
See id. (“Compliance requirements are streamlined and cost-effective . . . .”).
207
Id.
208
Id.
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Trade Commission, and state governments may force corporations
to comply with the Safe Harbor Privacy Principles at any time.209
Another way that countries work with the strict EU
requirements is to restrict data flow within a country’s borders.
Some international cloud service providers have special EU-only
data clouds that prevent EU data from being transferring outside of
the EU.210 Under EU data law, individuals have a fundamental
right to delete or access their personal data.211 This requires cloud
service providers to communicate effectively with individuals and
indicate where their data is stored.212
C. Proposals Moving Forward
Industry groups, academic scholars, and cloud service
providers in the United States are divided on how cloud computing
should be regulated.
1. Industry-Led Self-Regulation for Cloud Computing
The Software and Information Industry Association (the
“SIIA”) and Cloud Security Alliance are the largest groups
advocating minimal regulation of the cloud computing space. The
SIIA comprises 500 software and information companies.213 The
position of SIIA is that the cloud computing industry should selfregulate, and the government should not create laws for the
industry to follow.214 The SIIA wants to “[p]romote open

209

See id. (“Depending on the industry sector, the Federal Trade Commission,
comparable U.S. government agencies, and/or states may provide overarching
government enforcement of the Safe Harbor Privacy Principles.”).
210
SOTTO, supra note 166, at 4.
211
Id. at 5.
212
See id.; Opinion 05/2012 on Cloud Computing, at 11, WP 196 (July 1, 2012) (stating
that transparency requires providers to inform individuals of all subcontractors
“contributing to the provision of the respective cloud service” as well as the location of
all data centers where personal data is processed).
213
Hayley Tsukayama, No Need for Cloud-Specific Legislation, SIIA Industry Group
Says, The WASH. POST (JULY 26, 2011, 9:04 AM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/
blogs/post-tech/post/no-need-for-cloud-specific-legislation-siia-industry-group-says/
2011/07/26/gIQAHaEaaI_blog.html.
214
See SIIA’s Cloud Computing Recommendations for Policymakers, SOFTWARE &
INFORMATION INDUSTRY ASSOCIATION, http://www.siia.net/index.php?option=com_
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standards for software and data interoperability, and avoid policies
that would favor one particular business model or technology over
another . . . [and] [p]romote policies that allow to the greatest
extent possible, unrestricted transfer of data across borders.”215
The SIIA works with the U.S. government, particularly the
National Institute of Standards and Technology, to create open
standards for privacy and data security under the current “Cloud
First” policy.216 The Cloud Security Alliance is a group of
industry practitioners and corporations that work to promote the
use of best practices for addressing security issues when using
cloud computing technology.217 The Cloud Security Alliance
advocates minimal government intrusion.218 Both the CSA and the
SIIA believe that if one country’s regulations are too restrictive on
the movement of data and privacy, cloud service providers should
simply move their data to a different location.
2. Cloud Computing Needs Regulation and Clarity
Academic scholars have set forth the view that cloud
computing regulations are essential to U.S. national security and
foreign policy interests.219 However, scholars taking this stance
dispute whether cloud computing should be regulated through the
manipulation of export controls or through jurisdiction and
contractual obligations.220 These scholars are concerned that
flexibility in cloud computing is not worth the uncertainty of the
content&view=article&id=807:siias-cloud-computing-recommendations-forpolicymakers&catid=163:public-policy-articles (last visited Mar. 29, 2013).
215
Id.
216
See Letter from Ken Wasch, President, Software & Info. Indus. Ass’n, to Dawn
Leaf, Exec. Program Manager, Cloud Computing, Nat’l Inst. of Standards and Tech.
(Dec. 13, 2011), available at http://siia.net/index.php?option=com_docman&task=
doc_download&gid=3235&Itemid=318.
217
About, CLOUD SECURITY ALLIANCE, https://cloudsecurityalliance.org/about (last
visited Mar. 19, 2013).
218
See STAR FAQ, CLOUD SECURITY ALLIANCE, https://cloudsecurityalliance.org/star/
faq (last visited Mar. 19, 2013) (“In these early days of cloud adoption, voluntary selfregulation of cloud providers is preferable to heavy handed governmental regulation.”).
219
See generally Villasenor, supra note 26, at 1 (discussing why cloud computing
should be regulated).
220
See id. at 1–2 (discussing how issues of jurisdiction related to cloud control have
been studied, but not enough attention has been given to export control and its
relationship to cloud computing).
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location of data in the cloud or the vague contractual terms, unless
there are strict regulations controlling jurisdiction and contractual
obligations.221 They consider cloud computing an “immature and
rapidly-developing market” where there is a “mismatch” between
consumer expectations and the services consumers receive.222
Issues with the location of data may create conflicts if the contract
specifies a foreign legal system and jurisdiction.223
The Brookings Institute, a nonprofit public research and policy
organization in Washington, D.C., champions the regulation of
cloud computing.224 Its Board of Trustees is comprised of
distinguished representatives from a broad swath of the public,
including the Chief Investment Officer of Yale University.225 The
Brookings Institute argues that if no action is taken to regulate
cloud computing, the government’s failure to regulate may weaken
the entire U.S. export control system.226
John Villasenor, senior fellow in Governance Studies at the
Center for Technology Innovation at Brookings, favors regulation
in security, privacy and jurisdictional issues.227
Villasenor
recommends that cloud service providers give users a choice over
the location of the server storing their data.228 Under this plan,
users would be able to choose if they want to pay “a slight
premium to ensure the assignment of servers based in the United

221
See Simon Bradshaw, Christopher Millard, & Ian Walden, The Terms They Are AChangin’ . . . Watching Cloud Contracts Take Shape, 7 ISSUES IN TECH. INNOVATION 1, 1,
5–6 (2011), available at http://www.brookings.edu/papers/2011/03_cloud_computing_
contracts.aspx.
222
Id. at 11.
223
Id. at 2.
224
The goals of the Institute are to “[s]trengthen American democracy . . . .[f]oster the
economic and social welfare, security and opportunity of all Americans[ and] . . .
“[s]ecure a more open, safe, prosperous and cooperative international system.” About
Brookings, BROOKINGS INST., http://www.brookings.edu/about.aspx (last visited Mar. 19,
2013).
225
See Board of Trustees, BROOKINGS INST., http://www.brookings.edu/about/
Trustees.aspx (last visited Mar. 19, 2012); (“The Brookings Board of Trustees is
composed of distinguished business executives, academics, former government officials
and community leaders.”).
226
See VILLASENOR, supra note 26, at 10.
227
See id.
228
See id. at 7.

C07_SEGALL (DO NOT DELETE)

2013]

4/17/2013 4:06 PM

JURISDICTIONAL CHALLENGES IN CLOUD COMPUTING

1145

States,” and thus have a more secured server.229 A pricing plan
may set off the cost to cloud computing technology companies.230
3. Cloud Computing Service Providers Attempt to Control
Which Law Governs Their Data Servers
The Cloud Legal Project at the Centre for Commercial Law
Studies, based at the School of Law at Queen Mary, University of
London, conducted a survey of thirty-one cloud computing
contracts from twenty-seven different providers.231 The study
found that these contracts mandate that law from various U.S.
states or English law applied and could force users to defend a suit
in an unfamiliar place.232 Some countries outside the United States
do not have the same civil rights safeguards.233 Without legislation
and policy, users of cloud computing services could be subject to
arbitrary laws.234
The surveyed contracts often had exclusion clauses and
disclaimers buried deep within the contract terms that allow the
companies to alter these contracts at will.235 For instance, the
Amazon Web Service Customer Agreement (2011) states, “[w]e
may modify this Agreement (including any Policies) at any time by
posting a revised version on the AWS Site . . . . By continuing to
use the Service Offerings after the effective date of any
modifications to this Agreement, you agree to be bound by the
modified terms.”236 Here, Amazon essentially reserves the right to
229

Id.
See id. at 7–8.
231
See Simon Bradshaw, Christopher Millard, & Ian Walden, Contracts for Clouds:
Comparison and Analysis of the Terms and Conditions of Cloud Computing Services, 19
INT’L J. L. & INFO. TECH. 187, 191 (2011). The survey included the following providers:
37signals, 3tera, Adrive, Akamai, Amazon, Apple, Decho, Dropbox, ElasticHosts,
Facebook, Flexiant, G.ho.st, GoGrid, Google, IBM, Iron Mountain, Joyent, Microsoft,
Nirvanix, PayPal, Rackspace UK, Salesforce, Symantec, The Planet, UKFast, Zecter, and
Zoho. Id. at 193–94. The survey was partially funded by Microsoft. Id. at 187 n.*.
232
Id. at 198–200.
233
Jaeger, supra note 15, at § 5.
234
See id.
235
Bradshaw, supra note 231, at 9 (“A large portion of the contracts we analyzed
included terms providing that the provider could amend the contract simply by posting an
updated version on its web site; if a customer continues to use the service, this is deemed
acceptance of the new terms.”).
236
AWS CUSTOMER AGREEMENT, supra note 125, at § 12.
230
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modify its contract, or the terms governing the location of its data
servers.
These technology companies often have terms of service that
limit liability of the company.237 Terms in Google’s “Google Apps
for Business Online Agreement” govern requests by third parties to
access private information:238
Customer is responsible for responding to Third
Party Requests. Google will, to the extent allowed
by law and by the terms of the Third Party Request:
(a) promptly notify Customer of its receipt of a
Third Party Request; (b) comply with Customer’s
reasonable requests regarding its efforts to oppose a
Third Party Request; and (c) provide Customer with
the information or tools required for Customer to
respond to the Third Party Request. Customer will
first seek to obtain the information required to
respond to the Third Party Request on its own, and
will contact Google only if it cannot reasonably
obtain such information.239
It is unclear if this provision applies to “Google Apps for
Government.” These customer agreements often have vague terms
because the service providers may not know which country’s law
governs their contracts and whether police enforcement could
access confidential user data.240
Public and private companies that provide cloud computing
services are often unaware of the laws that apply to their data
237

See,
e.g.,
AWS
Service
Terms,
AMAZON
WEB
SERVICES,
http://aws.amazon.com/serviceterms/ (last updated Mar. 7, 2013) (“We have no liability
or responsibility with respect to any delay, damage or loss incurred during shipment,
including loss of Data.”); Google Apps for Business (Online) Agreement, GOOGLE APPS,
http://www.google.com/apps/intl/en/terms/premier_terms.html (last updated Mar. 28,
2012) (“Neither party will be liable under this agreement for lost revenues or indirect,
special, incidental, consequential, exemplary, or punitive damages, even if the party knew
or should have known that such damages were possible and even if direct damages do not
satisfy a remedy.”).
238
See Google Apps for Business (Online) Agreement, supra note 237.
239
Id.
240
See BRAD SMITH, BUILDING CONFIDENCE IN THE CLOUD: A PROPOSAL FOR INDUSTRY
AND GOVERNMENT ACTION TO ADVANCE CLOUD COMPUTING 7.
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servers or the information they contain. A Microsoft memo on
building the cloud industry observed,
There are, however, no universally agreed upon
rules governing such access by law enforcement.
The result is that service providers are increasingly
subject to divergent, and at times conflicting, rules
governing jurisdiction over user content and data.
Further complicating the problem is the fact that
different jurisdictions also have different laws
regarding privacy rights and data retention.241
These conflicting messages make it difficult for cloud service
providers to meet consumer expectations for competent privacy
and security protections.242
D. Potential Conflicts if the Government Does Establish Uniform
Regulation
There are many loopholes in the U.S. government’s approach
to regulating cloud computing technology. The GAO has
identified a number of negative security implications that would
occur if the government continues to neglect regulation of the
cloud computing industry.243 Twenty-two of twenty-four major
federal agencies reported that they were “concerned or very
concerned about the potential information security risks associated
with cloud computing.”244
If sensitive U.S. government data is sitting in countries that
abide by the Budapest Convention on Cybercrime, local police
may have access to private government information.245 Access
241

Id.
Id. (“This global thicket of competing and conflicting laws presents a significant
obstacle to the delivery of cloud services that meet users’ reasonable expectations of
privacy.”).
243
See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-12-130T, Information Security:
Additional Guidance Needed to Address Cloud Computing Concerns 6–7 (2011),
available at http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-130T (“The use of cloud computing
can also create numerous information security risks for federal agencies. . . . Several of
these risks relate to being dependent on a vendor’s security assurances and practices.”).
244
Id. at 6.
245
See Convention on Cybercrime, supra note 152, at art. 19(1) (“Each Party shall
adopt such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to empower its competent
242
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may be necessary in certain emergency situations such a data
server meltdown, but the Budapest Convention mandates a low
standard for abridging private rights.246
Another potential problem is that government contracts with
private companies often do not include terms dictating the location
of the data servers that hold their information. With choice of law
provisions unclear as to whether a data server implicates a legal
interest, it is difficult to determine what law would apply overseas
in a security breach of a server. Contractual provisions could solve
this problem, but private companies currently have full discretion
to change their terms at any point.247
III. RECOMMENDATIONS
The federal government must have absolute control over the
storage of its electronic information, including the ability to select
safe countries to host this information and the right to determine
the frequency with which private and public data service providers
can move the government’s information to different servers.
A. Cloud Computing Regulations Will Secure Government
Information
Some scholars have found that the main reason for the lack of
cloud computing regulations in the United States is a “lack of a
political infrastructure that reacts deftly to rapid technological

authorities to search or similarly access: (a) a computer or part of it and computer data
stored therein; and (b) a computer-data storage medium in which computer data may be
stored, in its territory.”).
246
See id. at art. 19(2) (“Each Party shall adopt such legislative and other measures as
may be necessary to ensure that where its authorities search or similarly access a specific
computer system or part of it, pursuant to paragraph 1.a, and have grounds to believe that
the data sought is stored in another computer system or party of it in its territory, and
such data is lawfully accessible from or available to the initial system, the authorities
shall be able to expeditiously extend the search or similar accessing to the other
system.”).
247
Bradshaw, supra note 231, at 9 (“A large portion of the contracts we analyzed
included terms providing that the provider could amend the contract simply by posting an
updated version on its web site; if a customer continues to use the service, this is deemed
acceptance of the new terms.”).
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change.”248 The transmission of sensitive government information
to data servers around the world creates an urgent need for broad
directives to protect our private information from unwarranted
intrusions. In a cloud computing environment, the owner of data
loses control to a third party company that chooses the storage
location of the owner’s data.249 The United States needs
regulations, similar to EU data directives, to protect private
government information. When data is stored in other countries,
these types of regulations are vital in preventing other countries
from conducting arbitrary server inspections or claiming a right to
access to the actual data stored on each server.
With increasing frequency, private companies that offer cloud
computing services are reporting breaches of security. It is
estimated that U.S. businesses and institutions lose sixty-seven
billion dollars to cybercrime every year.250 Microsoft has admitted
that, “the aggregation of massive amounts of data in large
datacenters also creates a new and highly tempting target for
criminals. As criminals turn their attention to these vaults of
information . . . it will become increasingly challenging to protect
such datacenters from both physical and cyber attacks.”251 The
prospect of attacks on the countries—as well as the physical
location of data servers—makes information protection a major
concern.
The U.S. government must act to prevent foreign countries
accessing data servers sitting on their territories from
circumventing U.S. law.252

248

Jaeger et al., supra note 15, at § 6.
Irion, supra note 79, at 9.
250
Twelfth United Nations Congress on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice,
Salvador, Braz., Apr. 12–19, 2010, Recent Developments in the Use of Science and
Technology by Offenders and by Competent Authorities in Fighting Crime, Including the
Case of Cybercrime, ¶ 8, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.213/9 (Jan. 22, 2010), available at
http://www.unodc.org/documents/crime-congress/12th-CrimeCongress/Documents/A_CONF.213_9/V1050382e.pdf.
251
SMITH, supra note 240, at 2.
252
See id. (“For the cloud to deliver on its promise, Congress needs to take responsible
action to foster users’ confidence that their privacy interests will be preserved and their
data will remain secure in the cloud.”).
249
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B. One Way to Ensure the Security of Government Information is
for the Government to Purchase its own Private Data Centers
The U.S. government should explore the option of building its
own private data servers on U.S. soil. As the government has
saved significant capital storing its data on server farms, some of
these reserves should be used towards securing this information.
One way to ensure that one’s property is completely secure is to
safeguard that property oneself. If it were not for the digitization
of data, the U.S. Government would never think to outsource the
storage of hard copy files.
To obtain this high level of security, the government should
build its own private data centers. The government is currently the
largest property owner in the U.S., holding 1.2 million individual
properties.253
Much of this property is either empty or
underutilized, and the Obama Administration categorizes this
property as “excess.”254 These excess properties cost American
taxpayers an estimated “$190 million a year.”255 Although it
would be costly to develop the software infrastructure needed, the
government could contract out services to technology companies,
but require that the information is stored on its property.
C. If it is Not Feasible for the Government to Own its Own Data
Centers, Data Servers Containing Private Government
Information Should Remain in the United States
If it is not feasible for the government to build its own data
servers because the program would be too costly or time
consuming, the government should mandate that data centers
storing its information remain in the U.S.
U.S. cities have lead this initiative. For example, the City of
Los Angeles (“LA”) contracts out e-mail service and data storage

253

Cutting Costs by Getting Rid of Buildings We Don’t Need, THE WHITE HOUSE,
http://www.whitehouse.gov/issues/fiscal/excess-property-map (last visited Mar. 20,
2013); Jared A. Favole, Uncle Sam Finds 14,000 Facilities to Sell, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 2,
2011, 7:36 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2011/03/02/uncle-sam-finds-14000facilities-to-sell.
254
See id.
255
Id.
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to Google.256 In LA’s contract with Google, LA requires that email data be stored and processed only in data servers in the
continental U.S.257 However, Google does not have enough data
server capacity in the U.S. to store both e-mail and other data.258
LA requires notice from Google when space in Google’s U.S. data
server’s becomes available, so LA can migrate non-e-mail data to
Google’s U.S. servers.259 While most LA city employees use
Gmail for e-mail, the LAPD cannot use Google services because
the data servers that run Google Apps for Government are located
in the EU.260 Google cannot require EU employees, who run
Google’s international data servers, to submit to background
checks to meet the standards of the LAPD.261 If the U.S.
government were to stand behind LA’s decision, cloud computing
service providers would have to create more secure U.S.-based
data servers.

256

See David Sarno, L.A. Won’t Put LAPD on Google’s Cloud-Based Email System,
L.A. Times (Dec. 14, 2011), http://articles.latimes.com/2011/dec/14/business/la-figoogle-email-20111215.
257
Contract Number C-116359, Between the City of Los Angeles and Computer
Science Corporation for the SaaS E-Mail and Collaboration Solution (SECS) § 1.7 (Nov.
10, 2009), available at http://clkrep.lacity.org/onlinecontracts/2009/C-116359_c_11-2009.pdf, Appendix J.1, Section 1.7 of the Professional Services Contract between Google
and the City of Los Angeles (“Google agrees to store and process Customer’s email and
Google Message Discovery (GMD) data only in the continental United States. As soon
as it shall become commercially feasible, Google shall store and process all other
Customer Data, from any other Google Apps applications, only in the continental United
States. Google shall make commercially reasonable efforts to advise Customer when
such data storage capability is made available. Notwithstanding the foregoing, Google
may store and process Login Data in any country in which Google or its agents maintain
facilities.”).
258
See Sarno, supra note 256 (“Google may have overestimated its ability to satisfy
strict federal security rules about sensitive data from law enforcement agencies. . . . [T]he
rules were written for law enforcement agencies that store their own data and did not
consider the increasingly popular cloud computing model.”).
259
Contract Number C-116359, supra note 257, at § 1.7.
260
See Jeff Gould, Los Angeles Pulling the Plug on Gmail at LAPD is Much Bigger
than You Think, SAFEGOV (Dec. 15, 2011), http://safegov.org/2011/12/15/los-angelespulling-the-plug-on-gmail-at-lapd-is-much-bigger-than-you-think
(“[A]nalyst
firm
Gartner reported in July that some of Google’s support staff with access to [Google Apps
for Government] servers are based on Europe.”);
261
See id. (“The FBI doesn’t explicitly mandate that support personnel be located in the
U.S., but European law may make it difficult for Google to force its European employees
to submit to screening (including fingerprinting) by U.S. authorities.”).
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It is also important that the U.S. government move away from
the idea that cloud computing regulations “restrict free trade.”262
The OMB and the USTR must recognize that these regulations are
in place to secure private government and consumer data. As
discussed earlier, many countries around the world restrict the flow
of data to within their borders; there is no reason the United States
should not also adopt this policy.
In addition to the proposition that government information
must remain in the U.S., broad regulations governing contracts
with private parties are necessary to achieve security through the
cloud computing agenda. NIST is one of the only agencies that
has comprehensively thought about the different requirements for
the various cloud computing platforms.263
NIST has also
considered the interdependency of the U.S. government’s cloud
computing program with other cyber security and national security
initiatives.264 The problem is that NIST lacks the authority to
regulate other government agencies and only has the authority to
create a roadmap or guidance document.265 It is important that
Congress delegate the authority to develop a plan to protect
government information.
The uncoordinated U.S. approach contrasts starkly with the
pool of countries that have developed comprehensive cloud
computing laws. The United States is supposed to be a global
technology leader, but among most developed countries, the
262

Technosource Info. Servs., LLC, B-405296 et al., Comp. Gen. (2011), available at
http://www.gao.gov/decisions/bidpro/405296.pdf.
263
See PETER MELL & TIMOTHY GRANCE, THE NIST DEFINITION OF CLOUD COMPUTING:
RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF STANDARDS AND TECHNOLOGY 1
(2011), available at http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-145/SP800-145.pdf
(“The intended audience of this document is system planners, program managers,
technologists, and others adopting cloud computing as consumers or providers of cloud
services.”).
264
LEE BADGER, TIM GRANCE, ROBERT PATT-CORNER, & JEFF VOAS, CLOUD
COMPUTING SYNOPSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ES-2, 1-1 (2012), available at
http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-146/sp800-146.pdf.
265
Id. at 1-1 (“Nothing in this document should be taken to contradict standards and
guidelines made mandatory and binding on Federal agencies by the Secretary of
Commerce under statutory authority, nor should these guidelines be interpreted as
altering or superseding the existing authorities of the Secretary of Commerce, Director of
the OMB, or any other Federal official.”).
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United States has the least cohesive security plans regulating cloud
computing technology.
CONCLUSION
No government agency has comprehensively looked at all of
the risks concerning cloud computing technology, and the law of
countries where data servers are located. As the government
increasingly moves sensitive data to private companies that are
free to store information in massive data servers overseas, U.S.
citizens face countless threats to their privacy and the security of
their data. The government must at least attempt to keep its own
information on U.S. soil. If this is not feasible, data servers
containing sensitive government information must at least remain
in the United States.

